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Editorial on the Research Topic
Beyond Embodied Cognition: Intentionality, Affordance, and Environmental Adaptation
Considering that humans must use external tools to solve problems, any account of
human cognition should incorporate such intentional tool-using processes into its models of
environmental adaptation. In the traditional ecological paradigm and embodied cognitive science,
affordances (i.e., possibilities for action which are available for an agent to perceive directly and
act upon) are nested in environment (Gibson, 1979). Intentionality is defined as a power of
minds that simultaneously coordinates with multiple affordances (e.g., Kiverstein and Rietveld,
2015). Exploring potential mechanisms that are responsible for intentionality would open up new
avenues for developing alternative paradigms of psychology on differing assumptions regarding the
relationship among mind, body, and environment. This Research Topic is devoted to the particular
question; how embodied cognitive processes contribute to the adaptation to a given environment
with intentionality.
One of the interests of this Research Topic was to provide an explanation of the relationship
between the sensorimotor process and one’s interaction with the environment. Huang et al. aimed
at the exploring the potential dissociation between the sense of 1PP-location (i.e., first-person
perspective) and body-location. In doing so they approached a topic that is of great interest in
the field of self-consciousness and self-perception. Since the sense of self-location is crucial for
one’s interaction with the environment, recognizing the distinctive roles of 1PP-location and body-
location would contribute to a better picture of environmental adaptation. Their data showed that
under different manipulations of movement, the spatial unity between 1PP-location and body-
location could be temporarily interrupted. Interestingly, they also observed a “double-body effect”
and further suggested that it is better to consider body-location and 1PP-location as interrelated
but distinct factors that jointly support the sense of self-location. Their conclusion may help to
explain the tremendous flexibility of our bodily experiences in coping with novel environmental
challenges. By recruiting patients with schizophrenia, Sevos et al. examined whether the addition of
a more salient action context can promote the emergence of affordance effect during the perception
of everyday objects. Participants performed two Stimulus–Response-Compatibility tasks in which
they were presented with semantic primes related to sense of property or goal of action prior
to viewing each graspable object. Controls responded faster when their response hand and the
graspable part of the object were compatibly oriented, but only when the context was congruent
with the individual’s needs and goals. When the context operated as a constraint, the affordance-
effect was disrupted. These results support the understanding that object-affordance is flexible and
not just intrinsic to an object. The authors also noted that the lack of sensorimotor facilitation in
patients with schizophrenia would require extensive use of higher cognitive processes even for the
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simplest routine activities in their daily life. Their conclusion
was informative to understand the specific mechanisms behind
schizophrenia.
Another appealing questions in this topic is how affordances
are perceived. Human infants are not born understanding how
to perceive affordance. It takes two corequisite sets of control
processes to explain the manner of the affordances learning
(Iran-Nejad and Bordbar). For conceptual understanding (CU),
knowers have deliberate attention-allocation control over their
first-person “knowthat” and “knowhow” content combined as
mutually coherent corequisites. For biofunctional understanding
(BU), knowers have attention-allocation control only over their
knowthat content but knowhow control content is ordinarily
conspicuously absent. With a thematic focus on embodiment
science and an eye toward systematic consensus in systemic
cohesion, Iran-Nejad and Bordbar’s study explored the roles
of biofunctional and conceptual control processes in the
wholetheme spiral of biofunctional understanding. They tested
a hypothesis of the difference between CU and BU. Their
findings supported the notion that individuals are capable of
engaging in mind-body cohesion-sensing and consensus-seeking
practices. These findings are also discussed in terms of the
predicted differences between BU and CU control processes,
their roles in regulating the physically unobservable flow of
systemic cohesion in the wholetheme spiral, and a proposal
for systematic consensus in systemic cohesion to serve as the
second guiding principle in biofunctional embodiment science
next to physical science’s first guiding principle of systematic
observation. Ramstead et al. extended the notion of affordance to
encompass the sociocultural level and the scaffolding it provides
to cognition. They investigated the ways in which people perceive
and engage with cultural affordances. Aiming to account for the
relationship between cultural content and normative practices on
the one hand and immersive participation on the other hand, they
focused on the social practices that regulate joint attention and
shared intentionality.
We received a study from Schilhab noticing that the multi-
functional nature of smart technology leading to noticeable
changes in affordances and embodiment. She addressed the
question to how social interaction (e.g., deep conversations)
facilitates the development of offline-cognition (e.g., mental
imagery, stream of consciousness, etc.) that enables the (self-)
regulation of online cognition and interactions with technology.
This opinion article took us back to 2002, when one of Wilson’s
much-cited six claims were published (Wilson, 2002). To some
extent, this article, together with Lee et al. (2012)’s results, again
invites us to take more seriously the philosophical issue of the
“natural kind” (e.g., Millikan, 1999; Ellis, 2001) for which off-line
aspects of embodied cognition is a proxy in on-line interactions
with the environment. In traditionally view, Behavior is thought
to be a means to control the environment, which ignores the
fact that the target object can be perceived through activity. For
example, some people take their seat after confirming the space
between the table and the chair; others first sit down and then re-
evaluate or adjust the distance. Therefore, even though the initial
stimulus is always perception, the interaction continues back and
forth between perception and action. Cognition serves to guide
the behaviors that acquire perceptions needed for new behaviors.
The two behaviors, before or after reappraisal, communicate
information. Gibson (1979) conceptualized this information
as survival-related symbols given by the environment to an
organism. Shaw extended this definition with the concept of
intention (e.g., Shaw, 2001). In brief, to survive, organisms
coordinate with their environment, communicate information,
and realize intentions. The conceptualized living (or survival) is
similar to the Gih of oriental philosophy. In this Topic, Lee et al.
attempts to build a meta-theory and to demonstrate empirical
designs for Gih, discussing the problems of themind and body, or
the subject and object, compared with the concept of “affordance”
proposed by ecological approaches. They claimed that Gih should
not remain in the domain of mysticism; the concept may be
addressed by psychological science to make use of valuable
insights from Eastern philosophy through empirical research.
Three studies investigated whether and how one important
characteristic of the sensory, motor, and emotional system
is reflected in language processing. Marino et al. report
two experiments on the relationship between language and
affordances. Participants were presented with short sentences
composed by verbs referring to motor chains and nouns of tools,
and were required to decide whether the image following the
sentence was mentioned in it or not. The results showed that the
grasp verb motor chain activated volumetric information, while
the functional motor chain activated information related to tool
use. Overall the studies demonstrate the influence of the motor
system and of its chained organization on language processing.
Buccino et al. investigated the embodiment of second language
and evidenced that embodied cognitive processes appear to
be substantially the same in L2 as it is in L1. Starting from
the available evidence to the effect that language processing
relies on the same sensory, motor, and emotional structures
that are involved when individuals experience the contents of
language material, they found that the processing of English
nouns by native speakers of Italian who also speak English
recruits the same neural substrates as the Italian equivalents.
Baumeister et al. investigates whether the link between language
and emotion is reduced in L2. Late Spanish-English bilinguals
were required to categorize a set of English and Spanish words
into “associated to emotion” or “not associated to emotion,”
then they were submitted to a surprise recognition task (old/new
word). Electromyography (EMG) and skin conductance (SC)
were recorded; in particular, muscle activity for corrugator and
zygomaticus muscles in response to happy and angry emotional
words for both L1 and L2 was detected. Results indicate stronger
enhancement of memory for emotional over neutral stimuli in L1
than in L2; furthermore, results of the EMG and SC recordings
indicate a slightly reduction of facial motor resonance and SC
responses to emotional stimuli in L2. In line with embodied
cognition views, they suggest that the processing of emotional
L2 words is less grounded in the motor, sensory, and autonomic
nervous systems than the processing of L1 words.
In addition, one general original research and one
commentary article were concerned with the methodological
issues on embodied cognition research. Cantarero et al. focus
on the relationship between gestures and moral behavior and
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investigates whether body gestures commonly associated with
(dis)honesty influence white lies. Participants were asked to give
feedback about the work of an artist they did not like in his face,
facing the dilemma between telling him the truth or lying to him,
thus preserving him from feeling bad (other oriented lie). During
the conversation they had to hold the hand-over-heart gesture,
typically related to honesty, or the fingers crossed, and hand over
elbow gestures. In the first experiment they find that the hand-
over-heart gestures is less associated to other oriented lies. In the
pre-registered experiment 2 they did not replicate the previous
result: the hand-over-heart gesture did not impede participants
to use other-oriented white lies. The authors discuss their
results in the framework of research on embodied cognition,
arguing that high methodological standards are necessary, in
particular when effect sizes are small. Based on Sevos et al. data,
Faulkenberry and Tummolini’s commentary pointed out the
issues that are present when trying to interpret non-significant
results in the traditional null hypothesis statistical testing
framework, and offered a quick example of how to use a Bayesian
approach to quantify evidence for object-affordance effects and
other action-specific influences on perception in the study of
embodied cognition.
This topic also comprises articles from other distinctive
perspectives which speak to the multifaceted research in this
field. Einarsson and Ziemke’s contribute to this research topic,
is an illustration—using the case of interactive music—of how
seemingly highly abstract, disembodied and unsituated activities,
such as the composition of musical works, can in fact be
strongly grounded in concrete embodied and situated activity.
Their theoretical perspectives and concrete examples may help
to elucidate how situations—and with them affordances—are
dynamically constructed through the interactions of biological,
contextual, social, and cultural mechanisms as embodied and
situated activity unfolds. Martínez-Pernía et al. introduced a level
of treatment that precedes behavior and cognition in a case study.
This theoretical consideration allowed the discovery of a better
relation between affordance and the environmental adaptation
for the improvement behavioral and cognitive performance in
their case study.
The final collection of 13 articles provides an overview
of current trends and opinions, as well as perspectives on
theoretical and methodological questions. As pointed out by
our CFP, psychology has continued to formulate and refine a
variety of paradigms to provide solutions for the mind-body
problem. Although a number of contemporary psychologists
believe they have avoided dualism by noting the close relationship
between certain brain activities and certain cognitive events, it
appears likely that such a relationship will soon be discovered
for all mental events. Replacing the term mind-body with
the term mind-brain does little to solve the problem of
how the brain can cause something mental. The traditional
metaphysics founded in subject-object dichotomy is still at the
basis of the majority of paradigms in psychology. We hope
that the reader will find the collected articles both informative
and thought-provoking, and that this Research Topic will
stimulate the scientific debate contributing to overcome such a
dichotomy.
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